Description
The Pronamic Pay plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 10.1.0 This is due to the `maybe_update_user_role()` function passing an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms field value (`$lead[$feed->user_role_field_id]`) directly into `WP_User::set_role()` without any allowlist validation, capability comparison, or permission check to constrain which roles can be assigned. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to escalate their own WordPress account to Administrator by tampering with the role field value in a form submission. Exploitation requires that an administrator has already configured a Pronamic Pay payment feed in Gravity Forms with the **Update User Role** option enabled and mapped to a form field; once that configuration is in place, no further preconditions exist to prevent an authenticated attacker from exploiting this vulnerability.
References7
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pronamic-ideal/tags/10.1.0/p…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pronamic-ideal/tags/10.1.0/p…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pronamic-ideal/tags/10.1.0/p…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pronamic-ideal/tags/10.1.0/p…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3630401/pronamic-ideal/tru…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Fpronamic-ideal…
- www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d42b8856-e5d0…
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.8
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 48 · as of 13 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-269
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