Description
The Object Sync for Salesforce plugin is vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL Injection via the wordpress_object_type parameter of its /wp-json/object-sync-for-salesforce/push/ REST route. The route's permission callback (can_process()) checks only the HTTP method for the push class — no capability or nonce — so it is reachable by unauthenticated users. The wordpress_object_type value is concatenated directly into a SQL query (post_type = "$object_type", class-object-sync-sf-wordpress.php:328) and executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no $wpdb->prepare() (:578). Because REST body parameters are not magic-quoted, an attacker can break out of the quoted string and inject arbitrary SQL. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries (time-based blind), enabling extraction of sensitive information such as password hashes from the database. Only a valid wordpress_id (e.g. 1) is required — no authentication or Salesforce connection.
References5
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/object-sync-for-salesforce/t…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/object-sync-for-salesforce/t…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/object-sync-for-salesforce/t…
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/object-sync-for-salesforce/t…
- www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/78f964a7-bed3…
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 48 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-89
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