Description
A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.
References10
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2026:53670
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51031
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53655
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53671
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53684
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53721
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53728
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53763
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53797
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53826
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
8.8
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 10 · as of 12 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-22
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