CVE-2026-118657

01/Description

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.

02/References6

• github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087…
• github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b…
• github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0
• github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0
• github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p
• github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p