Description
Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, a globally mounted middleware.Static instance can interpret an encoded request path differently from Echo's router because the router matches the still-encoded path while the static handler uses the decoded URL.Path. The advisory demonstrates an encoded slash resolving to a file under the static root through the global static middleware, but the source is internally inconsistent about whether a route or group guard protects the corresponding literal path in that global-mount configuration. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.
References6
- github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087…
- github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b…
- github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0
- github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4
- github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.5
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 34 · as of 3 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-177CWE-863
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.