Description
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. From 0.13 until 1.8.0, authlib.common.security.is_secure_transport() uses a textual prefix comparison for loopback HTTP exemptions, so a URL whose userinfo begins with a loopback host can be accepted even when its parsed host is an external non-loopback system. An external party able to supply a URL to OIDC RP-Initiated Logout registration, authorization-server metadata validation, or another call site can bypass the TLS-required guard and cause cleartext redirection or acceptance of cleartext endpoints. The issue does not bypass redirect URI exact matching and does not by itself forge tokens or authenticate users. The vulnerable authlib.common.security.is_secure_transport() implementation in authlib/common/security.py misinterprets the userinfo component before OIDC RP-Initiated Logout dynamic client registration and other consumers enforce transport security. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.0.
Affected products
authlib: authlib
References4
- github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-jj7h-c3hg-m… ExploitMitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-jj7h-c3hg-m… ExploitMitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/95ad1f90acf0c7b9cf2a8f25e6eb3… Patch
- github.com/authlib/authlib/releases/tag/v1.8.0 Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
3.5
LOW
Score source: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 20 · as of 8 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-601CWE-693
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