Description
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. From 0.24.0 until 0.30.0, the Qwen2VLVideoBackend and Qwen3VLVideoBackend classes accept request-level values for the media_io_kwargs.video.max_frames and media_io_kwargs.video.fps fields without enforcing server-side ceilings. An unauthenticated caller can submit these values to the /tokenize endpoint, causing the sampler to decode every frame selected from attacker-controlled video input, consume disproportionate frontend memory, and potentially terminate the API process before scheduling or admission control. The Rust frontend is not affected because it rejects the media_io_kwargs field. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.
Affected products
vllm: vllm
References4
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-x6mc-67gf… MitigationVendor Advisory
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/ea723c81c3ea26425cb69503a5d… Patch
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/56729 Issue TrackingPatch
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.30.0 Release Notes
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 23 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-770
Could this be exploited in your environment?
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