Description
Ente provides end-to-end encrypted cloud services and security tools. Prior to server image 2026.07.09, the POST /emergency-contacts/approve-recovery endpoint authorized approval using a client-supplied userID and updated an emergency recovery session using only its client-supplied recovery-session UUID. An accepted emergency contact could submit the contact's own identifier, transition the victim's session from WAITING to READY, clear wait_till, retrieve recovery information, and continue account recovery before the owner-configured notice period expired. Exploitation of the approval bypass required the victim to have previously added and accepted the attacker as an emergency contact, and it did not create recovery rights for an arbitrary account. Separately, the same insufficiently scoped update pattern affected the reject and stop recovery transitions, allowing a user who knew another recovery-session UUID to potentially cancel a session to which the user was not a party. This issue is fixed in server image 2026.07.09.
References6
- github.com/ente/ente/commit/1fc4956f90277076559c16dedbfad10cb4d…
- github.com/ente/ente/commit/b3fa9f566466ac3660e276a67621130d684…
- github.com/ente/ente/pull/11311
- github.com/ente/ente/pull/11342
- github.com/ente/ente/security/advisories/GHSA-2hxj-953x-c2vw
- github.com/ente/ente/security/advisories/GHSA-2hxj-953x-c2vw
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
7.1
HIGH
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 36 · as of 11 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-639
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.