Description
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even when no archive entry matches. This occurs during migration planning before review of the migration list or use of --run-migrations; the vulnerable installed Nx copy is reached when the normal nx@latest handoff is bypassed with NX_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION, --run-id, or fallback after a temporary-install failure. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.10 and 23.2.1.
References7
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/38cd82a0c05e8212e538bdb87ccb198d6504e…
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/95474ab457e8e1dbdbefad29040c166105a8f…
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/de37c5ebd1852fac700d70726326236ac398a…
- github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36887
- github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.10
- github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.2.1
- github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
5.8
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 7 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-22CWE-73
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.