Description
The Gitea OpenID association callback in the security settings accepted a positive OpenID 2.0 assertion without checking that the signed-in user had started the linking. Because OpenID 2.0 allows unsolicited assertions, an attacker-controlled OpenID provider could attach the attacker's identity to the account of a signed-in victim who opened a crafted link, and the attacker could then sign in as the victim through OpenID login, which does not apply the local TOTP or WebAuthn checks. The callback now requires a time-limited `state` value bound to the user.
References5
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.4
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 2 · as of 10 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-287CWE-352
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