Description
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hexpm hex allows an attacker who can intercept HTTPS connections, and holds a certificate for a Hex host issued by a CA in Hex's bundled CA store, to impersonate that host to users who set cacerts_path to a CA store that leaves that CA out. cacerts_path (HEX_CACERTS_PATH) is documented as the path to the CA certificate store, used instead of the CA bundle that ships with Hex. Hex.HTTP.SSL.ssl_opts/1 passes the configured store as the cacerts option, but builds the partial_chain callback from the bundled store whether cacerts_path is set or not. Hex.HTTP.SSL.partial_chain/2 accepts a server chain when any certificate in it has the same public key as a bundled CA certificate, so a chain that leads to a bundled CA passes verification although the configured store doesn't contain that CA. Hostname verification still applies. This issue affects hex: from 0.20.2 before 2.5.2.
References6
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-103503.html
- github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/5f5a2136c7cf5991b6e8a30d645ca9f8e74…
- github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/6232a6498015e559743bec4f4fbec913883…
- github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/c9b26a46928bfcd546773571e09c1d05f4c…
- github.com/hexpm/hex/security/advisories/GHSA-rw8q-hg7m-cxgr
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-103503
Metrics
- CVSS 4.0
-
5.9
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 11 · as of 11 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-295
Could this be exploited in your environment?
A patch closes the known hole. A penetration test shows what an attacker can still reach — with proof.