Description
ACM/MCE assisted-service writes raw referenced pull-secret contents into `InfraEnv.status.conditions[].message` when pull-secret validation fails. A namespace principal with the stock `view` ClusterRole cannot directly read Secrets, but can read `InfraEnv` objects and recover the referenced Secret's `.dockerconfigjson` data from status. This bypasses the Kubernetes/OpenShift RBAC separation between read-only namespace viewers and Secret readers. In the reproduced proof, the same ServiceAccount was denied `get` and `list` on Secrets, but recovered synthetic pull-secret `username`, `password`, `email`, and base64 `auth` fields through `InfraEnv.status`.
References2
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
6.3
MEDIUM
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N - EPSS — exploit probability
- 0% percentile: 8 · as of 15 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-201
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