Description
vm2 before 3.12.2 contains an authorization bypass in the NodeVM external-module resolver. When an embedder configures `require.external` with a custom resolver (and `context: 'host'`), `LegacyResolver.customResolve` in lib/resolver-compat.js records the resolved module directory in `this.externals` as `new RegExp('^' + escapeRegExp(resolvedPath))`, without requiring a path separator or end-of-string boundary. Untrusted guest code can therefore require the allowlisted module (e.g. `foo`) and then require the absolute path of a non-allowlisted sibling whose path merely shares the resolved prefix (e.g. `.../node_modules/foo2/index.js`); the sibling passes `isPathAllowedForModule` and is loaded through `hostRequire`, so its top-level code runs in the host process before the exports are wrapped with `vm.readonly`, resulting in a sandbox escape and arbitrary code execution in the host context.
References5
- github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6ac3916da84e060c403e407b6b631…
- github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/91034466bfb7f56b95fd48083ec6c…
- github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/ab4ee7d803e8c80155e9eb3672226…
- github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-5h3f-q97h-c…
- www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.12.2-authorization-by…
Metrics
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.0
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS 4.0
-
9.5
CRITICAL
Score source: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — exploit probability
- 1% percentile: 49 · as of 9 November 2026
- CWE
- CWE-863
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