תיאור (מקור, אנגלית)
OAuth2 Proxy honours a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when deciding whether a request may skip authentication, because the guard added for CVE-2026-40575 is inert in the default reverse-proxy configuration. GetRequestURI in pkg/requests/util/util.go prefers that header over the real request URI whenever CanTrustForwardedHeaders returns true, and isAllowedPath in oauthproxy.go matches the skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex allow list against the resulting path. CanTrustForwardedHeaders in pkg/apis/middleware/scope.go grants that trust when the caller's address is in the trusted proxy set, and buildTrustedProxyNetSet falls back to defaultTrustedProxyIPs, which is 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0, whenever reverse proxy mode is enabled without trusted_proxy_ip configured. Every client is therefore treated as a trusted proxy. An unauthenticated attacker can request a protected upstream path while setting X-Forwarded-Uri to a value matching an allow-listed route, so the skip-auth decision is made against the spoofed value while the upstream receives the protected path unchanged.
קישורים6
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/v7.15.4/pkg/apis/mid…
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/issues/3506
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-…
- www.vulncheck.com/advisories/oauth2-proxy-through-authenticati…
- github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/issues/3506
מדדים
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.1
CRITICAL
מקור הציון: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - CVSS 4.0
-
9.3
CRITICAL
מקור הציון: CNA
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X - EPSS — סבירות ניצול
- 0% אחוזון 40 · נכון ל-9 בנובמבר 2026
- CWE
- CWE-290
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