תיאור (מקור, אנגלית)
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
קישורים6
- datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2
- datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3
- github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3…
- github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5c…
- metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2
מדדים
- CVSS 3.1
-
9.8
CRITICAL
מקור הציון: CNA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS — סבירות ניצול
- 0% אחוזון 39 · נכון ל-10 בנובמבר 2026
- CWE
- CWE-347CWE-757
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