תיאור (מקור, אנגלית)
Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").
מוצרים מושפעים
zephyrproject: zephyr
קישורים2
- github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-… ExploitPatchVendor Advisory
- github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/448a21da12c9ea28f7… Patch
מדדים
- CVSS 3.1
-
5.3
MEDIUM
מקור הציון: NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - EPSS — סבירות ניצול
- 0% אחוזון 35 · נכון ל-15 בנובמבר 2026
- CWE
- CWE-125
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